We would expect that the process of disintegration of the world economy during the inter-war period must have led to income divergence between countries. This is implied by economic theory and recent evidence of income convergence among the highly-integrated economies of of Western Europe and North America. Contrary to this, we find a very strong evidence for income convergence among rich countries during the inter-war period, and very weak evidence for income convergence during the heyday of the First Globalization. This presents us with a puzzle. Could it be that it is not so much trade, capital and labor flows that matter for income convergence but some other, less easily observable, forces like diffusion of information and technology?
Economic integration and income convergence
One of the main arguments in favor of economic integration is that, in addition to the fact that it raises incomes of all the participants, it helps proportionately more the poorer one. This is the view that has informed much of the recent literature on income convergence-whether of the conditional or unconditional variety. It is a view that has a long and distinguished pedigree in economic theory, and is supported by a fair amount of contemporary evidence. In theory, increased trade raises real incomes of all participants.
But access of the poor country to superior technology embodied in goods or capital or simply through intellectual exchange, allows greater productivity gains in a poor country that is further away from the production possibility frontier. Free capital flows will also help the poor country more, by bringing in new technology and by allowing it to tap into larger savings pool of a rich country. Finally, migration too should contribute to convergence in incomes, as people from poor countries migrate to the rich. Thus, greater integration reflected in closer sharing of information and technology (knowledge spillover), more trade, greater capital flows, and labor migration should help reduce the gap between the poor and the rich.
This view is behind a score of empirical papers on income convergence. The earliest papers on the convergence among industrialized countries over the period of a century beginning in 1870 were by Baumol (1986) , and Baumol and Wolff (1988) . The convergence literature continued with papers by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) on convergence among OECD countries, and then among European Community members (Ben-David, 1993) , individual US states (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) , European regions (e.g. Cannon and Duck, 2000, p. 418) , Spanish provinces (Goerlich and Mas, 2001) , and so forth.
2 In all such cases, greater economic integration among units (countries or regions or states) was shown to have resulted in income convergence-as we would expect from economic theory.
2 See also the review of findings in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) .
(for a review see Easterly and Levine 2001) makes this a more realistic possibility. A similar point is made by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) who, based on numerous empirical evidence and reruns of a number of equations originally estimated by various authors, argue that economic integration and convergence are orthogonal, and find that σ convergence among the future European Community countries continued during the inter-war period.
However, this possibility is not very seriously contemplated by many economists.
The finding of income convergence among the club of the rich countries (Western Europe and its offshoots-to use Maddison's terminology) during the earlier period of globalization 1870-1913 provides empirical support for the mainstream view. 6 The welldocumented post World War II convergence in incomes among the OECD countries (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, p. 244 , and more recently, Maudos, Pastor and Serrano, 2000; Li and Papell, 1999; Fuente, 1999; and Tsangarides, 2002) for the inter-war period, "..there was no period when divergence between countries was more 'big time'. We do not yet know how much of this should be attributed to the great depression, two world wars, anti-global policies and other forces" (p. 19). 7 Lindert and 6 See Williamson (1998, Figure 1 ), Lindert and Williamson (2001) , O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) . 7 In a different paper, Williamson (1991, p.34) mentions that his finding of wage divergence in rich countries between 1914 and 1945 is contradicted by the findings of Baumol, Blackman and Wolff (1989) and Abramowitz (1986, Table 1, p. 391 ) that convergence of GDP per capita or GDP per workerhour continued unabated except for the period of World War II. But the contradiction is never resolved, nor is it paid much attention to. This is strange for three reasons. First, most of the literature on convergence is couched in terms of GDP per capita. Why should we use a different criterion of convergence for this period? Second, the GDP per capita data, however problematic are probably less so that the real wage data whichare a real pot-pourri of average wages of five industries (Belgium), real wage of laborers in Sydney (Australia), average wage in manufacturing (Argentina), average daily wage of laborers in building trades (Canada) etc. Even within a country, the definitions of wages used by Williamson change over time quite a lot (see Appendix 1 in Williamson 1991) . Third, GDP per capita is surely a much better indicator of living standards than wages, and particularly so where wage earners account for 50 or less percent of labor force as was the case in most of these countries during the period under study. Such a violent process of disintegration of the world economy is, according to neoclassical economic theory, expected to lead to a slowdown in growth, and-what is important for our purposes-to affect disproportionately poorer countries. As the world economy disintegrates and trade and capital and labor flows dry out, the poorer countries would lose many advantages associated with greater economic integration: ability to use foreign technology, to receive capital, to export people and goods. All but the last are supposed to be greater for the poor members, since in a neoclassical world they benefit from easy application of the already known technology, and are supposed to be recipients of capital, and exporters of people. These are measures of inter-country inequality (with each country counting the same).
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Gini and Theil are, of course, measures of inequality closely related to the coefficient of variation (σ) which is often used in the convergence literature (the so called "sigma" convergence). We calculate Gini, Theil and sigma-convergence (σ) across the two groups of countries for the entire period 1820-1950 (annual data after 1870; see Figures 1 and 2 ).
The data on GDP per capita (expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars) are taken from Maddison (2001) . Figure 1 shows that using either Gini, Theil or the coefficient of variation, we find that WENAO incomes did not diverge during the inter-war period. 1 8 8 9 1 8 9 2 1 8 9 5 1 8 9 8 1 9 0 1 1 9 0 4 1 9 0 7 1 9 1 0 1 9 1 3 1 9 1 6 1 9 1 9 1 9 2 2 1 9 2 5 1 9 2 8 1 9 3 1 1 9 3 4 1 9 3 7 1 9 4 0 1 9 4 3 1 9 4 6 1 9 4 9 1 8 8 9 1 8 9 2 1 8 9 5 1 8 9 8 1 9 0 1 1 9 0 4 1 9 0 7 1 9 1 0 1 9 1 3 1 9 1 6 1 9 1 9 1 9 2 2 1 9 2 5 1 9 2 8 1 9 3 1 1 9 3 4 1 9 3 7 1 9 4 0 1 9 4 3 1 9 4 6 1 9 4 9 We can test for convergence also using standard regressions tests. As is conventionally done, we regress growth rate of GDP per capita (change in income logs) on initial level of income (y i, t-1 ) where i indicates country subscript, and t time,
Gini

13
13 This formulation is rife with problems. Other than the most obvious econpometric problems of omitted variable and endogeneity (which we address below), formulation such as (1) suffers from Galton's fallacy (see Quah, 1993 , Bliss 1999 . The weakness of empirical tests used to test for the β convergence (so that beta convergence can be observed both when one moves forward and backward in time) and can exist (1)
and ln Zit = ln (n it +g+δ) where n it = population growth rate, g=rate of labor augmenting technological progress and δ=depreciation rate (all derived from the textbook Solow model of economic growth), and u i , v t , and e it , country-time-and both-dependent error term.
14 All GDP per capita values are taken at 5 year intervals, and thus the growth rate (the dependent variable) is the average growth rate over a five year period.
Equations such as (1) potentially suffer from a number of econometric problems.
The most obvious are the omitted variable bias where relevant country-specific information is not included, 15 and endogeneity where the dependent and independent variables are jointly determined. We thus run three formulations of (1). The results are shown in Table 2 . Consider results for the entire sample of WENAO countries. In the first formulation, we simply run a pooled regression using indiscriminately cross-section and time-series data. For the pre-1914 period, we see no evidence of convergence; for the inter-war period, we obtain a statistically significant and negative coefficient on initial income. In the second formulation, we address potential endogeneity by instrumenting the right-hand side variables by their lagged values. No variable is still significant for the pre-1914 period; for the inter-war period, the coefficient on the initial income declines (as we would expect) and becomes significant at 5 percent level only. Finally, in the third formulation, we adjust for country-specific effects by estimating a fixed-effects model.
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whether the underlying distribution diverges, converges or stays the same is emphasized in Wodon and Yitzhaki (2002) . Even the interpreatation of the obtained results is questioned (Quah, 1996) . We use this formulation because it is the simplest and the most commonly used in the (immense) literature on convergence. Our view is that direct tests of unconditional convergence (as implied in the calculation of the Gini coefficients) are superior to the tests based on the regression analysis.
14 The sum of g and δ is assumed to be 0.05 (5 percent). 15 The model is by necessity (since relevant variables like investment rates, education levels etc. are unavailable) a very stripped-down one. There are strong grounds to believe that relevant country-specific features are omitted. One of the ways to correct for this is to include country-specific dummy variables. 16 In the STATA formulation, fixed effects do give an intercept term since unlike the constraint of intercept being equal to 0, the software imposes a different (equally arbitrary) constraint (the sum of country dummies=0). See http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/xtreg2.html.
The results are again the same: the pre-1914 period exhibits no convergence, the interwar period does, and a very strong one. The results for the restricted sample are, save for some small differences in the size of the coefficients, practically the same. 1870-1913 1918-1939 1870-1913 1919-1939 1870-1913 1919-1939 1870-1913 1918-1939 1870-1913 1919-1939 1870-1913 1919-1939 On the second point, the evidence allows us to reject the view that there was divergence of incomes among the rich countries, and thus that de-globalization must have been the cause of it. While we are agnostic as to the cause of inter-war income convergence, the fact of convergence seems beyond dispute. But this leaves us with a puzzle: Why should there be convergence while the world economy disintegrates, and moreover why would that convergence be even faster than during the period of rising trade, and capital and labor flows? We shall return to this question in the last section of the paper.
Crises and wars
We have noted that the two World Wars produced remarkable income divergence among WENAO countries. But also the 1890 and 1929 crises led to a remarkable reduction in inequality between the countries. In both cases, the later crisis and war (that is, the Great Depression and World War II) produced more violent effects than the earlier episodes of crisis and war (Table 3) . 
Growth rates
Finally, we may ask whether the inter-war period was unique by having had very low growth rates, as it is sometimes believed. Table 4 gives the population-weighted average growth rate of GDP per capita (using Maddison's data) for WENAO countries between 1870 and 1939. The end point of the first period is the peak before the crisis of 1890; the end point of the third period is the peak before the Great Depression. For the other two periods, the "natural" end-points are, of course, the two Wars. We see that the 1929-39 period displays a somewhat lower growth rate than the earlier periods. The differences however are not enormous. The differences between the periods are even less if we look at countries' growth rates abstracting from the population size (see Table 5 ). Both the median and mean (annualized five-year) growth rates were almost the same in the pre-and post-1914 periods (Tsble 5). It is only because of the Great Depression and due to the after-war rebound that the inter-war growth rates were more dispersed (see also Figure 4 ). Finally, one may wonder to what an extent income convergence in the inter-war period was due to Italy and Germany, the two major Fascist powers whose growth was fairly fast during a part of the inter-war period. 
The puzzle
We can now break down into its components the statement by Lindert and Williamson (2001) 1 9 0 0 1 9 0 4 1 9 0 8 1 9 1 2 1 9 1 6 1 9 2 0 1 9 2 4 1 9 2 8 1 9 3 2 1 9 3 6 1 9 4 0 1 9 4 4 1 9 4 8 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 6 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 6 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 6 Gini Theil dubbed "Fordism"). Italy's industrialization, for example, despite its highly autarchic system was decisively influenced by the American example. Giovanni Agnelli, FIAT's owner, after a visit to Ford, copied Ford's techniques of production. Olivetti, the officeequipment maker, and Pirelli, the tire company, were set on the path of becoming large multinationals in these years-again applying American techniques of mass production.
More generally, as Bairoch (1997, vol. 3, pp. 43-46) points out, the inter-war period witnessed the beginning of mass production of "non-essential" manufactured products.
While mass production of manufacturing in the late 19 th century concerned mostly clothing, in the early 20 th century, there was a remarkable growth of consumer durables and chemical industries (artificial silk and other substitutes). For example, the number of cars in the world increased from 2.5 million in 1914 to 50 million on the eve of World War II; at the same date, 93 million households (one out of two) in developed countries owned radio. As pointed out by Bairoch (1997, vol. 3, p. 45 ) the expansion of radio ownership within twenty years of its first appearance is unprecedented even compared with today: twenty years after the appearance of the first personal computers, only 30 percent of American households owned one. Production of other household durables (refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, washing machines) grew from nothing to millions, and, significantly, airplane production came of age.
In conclusion, for economies similar in terms of their incomes, structure and cultural proximity, trade and direct investments may not matter as much. Second, the responsive-non-ideological protectionism-was espoused by democracies during and after the Great Depression. The famous cobweb graph of world trade (Kindleberger, 1986) shows that the volume of world trade diminished for 49 consecutive months from January 1929 to February 1933-lots of it due to "beggar-thyneighbor" policies. As a League of Nations document (1936, p. 186-7) puts it "in order to trade with countries of highly developed protectionism, it is often necessary to adopt methods complementary to their systems."
In consequence, by the early 1930's, there was little doubt that the world was engaged into a period of disintegration, reflected in all the statistics (trade, capital flows, migration), but also driven by a changed ideology and by the experience of the Great Depression. The changed ideological climate is well captured in the words of Arthur Lewis (1949, p. 155) :
"it was then [after the Depression] that the international system seemed finally to break down; that currency controls multiplied; that tariffs reached enormous proportions and licenses became diminutive; and that the free multilateral flow of trade was constrained into bilateral channels. All these obstacles existed in the 1920, as an aftermath of war. But while in 1920 men regarded them as temporary, looked forward to their speedy removal…in the 1930's the obstacles came to be regarded by a much larger circle as desirable in themselves, and not just as temporary weapons for coping with a slump, but as a necessary part of national economic system."
Let us consider some facts. The share of trade in GDP either stagnated or declined. For the US, and especially, the UK, the decrease is quite clear. On the eve of the Great War, trade/GDP ratio amounted to 45 percent for the UK, and 12 percent for the US. The UK numbers steadily declined and by the mid-1930's were below 30 percent. In the US, the share dropped to 8 percent (see Baldwin and Martin, 1999, p. 15) .
Stagnation of trade volumes
Increasing barriers to trade
Generally speaking, barriers to trade increased compared to the period before the War. While there is some debate regarding the extent of protectionism in the 1920'swith Paul Bairoch (1993) holding that the period saw a declining or steady level protection and Kindleberger (1989) There is little doubt that by the mid-1930's, both tariff rates and non-tariff barriers have risen manifold compared to the situation before the World War I. 25 As the League of Nations (1936, p. 188) eloquently put it, "whenever trade crosses these [restricted trade] 24 Perusal of the League documents from the 1930's is indeed a melancholy exercise as both the author's and the reader's patience is taxed by a monotony enumeration of many restrictions, complicated bilateral arrangements and multitudes of exchange rates. The League of Nations continued providing very informative annual economic Surveys until 1944.
25 While prior to World War I, quantitative restrictions were negligible, during the 1930's between 50 and 70 percent of world trade was estimated to have been subject to NTB (Crafts, 2000, p.29) .
areas, and even within the area of freer trade, the present tendency seems to be for the new form of organization [protectionism] to gain ground, as if by a species of Gresham's Law." Source: Bairoch (1993) , Schoot (1994) , Gordon (1941) , Kuwahara (1998) as reported in Crafts (2000, p. 28) . Tariff rates are average tariff rates on manufactured goods. Moreover, by the mid-1930's, the world had broken into regional trading blocs.
Germany established its dominance and signed bilateral treaties with a number of SouthEast European countries. Italy tried to do the same within its fledgling Empire. Britain introduced the system of Imperial preferences, and Japan created the East Asian CoProsperity zone. In addition, the United States withdrew behind the high protective wall (in 1931, the average tariff on dutiable imports was 55 percent as against 38 percent on the eve of the World War I) 26 and the Soviet Union, first out of necessity, and then out of ideology, led an explicit autarkic policy. Autarky, not entertained as a serious idea even by the early mercantilists, became an explicit goal and part of the ideology of the most authoritarian right-wing and Fascist movements that increasingly held sway in Europe (Italy, Germany, Spain, Poland, Baltic republics, the Balkans), and Asia (Japan). Table   A1 .3 illustrates the increasing importance of economic blocs. 26 Bairoch (1993) quoted in Baldwin and Martin (1999, p.14) .
Abandonment of convertible currencies
Coupled with protectionism and regional blocs was, quite naturally, the end of the Gold Standard. 
Declining capital and labor flows
As trade protectionism and nationalism were on the rise, and capital controls became the norm, international capital flows dried out. Before World War I, most of capital flows took the form of purchases of railway and government bonds. According to the data quoted by Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin (1999, p. 30 ) the UK, the largest creditor nation, held 40 percent of its overseas investments in railway, and 30 percent in government bonds. The taste for both declined as investors faced increased political and economic hurdles and risks. 27 The devastation of France and Belgium, and weakened financial position of the Great Britain, combined with huge reparations imposed on Germany, cut the potential supply of funds in the largest capitalist countries (other than the US). As Table A1 .5 shows, foreign-held assets as a share of world GDP halved.
Average ( Labor migration which according to Williamson (1996) and O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) helped wage convergence within the Atlantic economy in the late 19 th century, driving wages up in the out-migrant countries of Northern and Western Europe, and wages down in the in-migrant countries (US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada) all but stopped as the policies of the largest recipient country became much more restrictive in the early 1920's. The US immigration rate fell by almost 2/3 (see Table 6 ).
Similarly As a glance at Figures 1 and 2 in the text reveals, original income divergence, according to Bairoch, is much sharper and seems to have lasted longer than the one obtained from Maddison's data. According to Bairoch, divergence starts around 1800 and goes on, almost without interruption, until 1890. After that, inequality is stable until the 29 Bairoch's GDPs per capita are given in 1960 international dollars. Prados de la Escosura's are expressed in current dollars of equal purchasing power parity, so that between-country comparisons for a given year are possible, but not comparisons between the years. The data base is scaled (for each year) in such a way that the US GDP per capita is equal to 1. 30 This is the reason why we cannot run the usual convergence regressions on these data. 31 Prados de la Escosura data are obtained by the so-called "short-cut" method, that is from a regression between the price level (purchasing power exchange rate over market exchange rate) on the LHS, and GDP per capita at current exchange rate and several other controls (openness, current account balance) on the RHS. The regression is run, of course, only for the countries for which the data are available. The estimated parameters from such an equation together with values for each independent variable are then used to predict the price level (that is, PPP) for the missing years and countries (see Prados de la Escosura, 2000, pp. 8-11). The fact that Prados de la Escosura data show income divergence while both Bairoch and Maddison show income convergence may be explained by the use of current PPPs by Prados de la Escosura. The implication is that prices of non-tradables have increased more in rich than in poor countries. FIN  FIN  FIN  FIN  FIN  FIN  FIN  FIN  FIN  FIN  FIN  FIN  FRA  FRA  FRA  FRA  FRA  FRA  FRA  FRA  FRA  FRA  FRA  FRA  GBR  GBR  GBR  GBR  GBR  GBR  GBR  GBR  GBR  GBR  GBR  GBR  GRC  GRC  GRC  GRC  GRC  GRC  GRC  GRC  GRC  IRL  IRL  IRL  IRL  ITA  ITA  ITA  ITA  ITA  ITA  ITA  ITA  ITA  ITA  ITA  ITA  NLD  NLD  NLD  NLD  NLD  NLD  NLD  NLD  NLD  NLD  NLD  NLD  NOR  NOR  NOR  NOR  NOR  NOR  NOR  NOR  NOR  NOR  NOR  NOR  NZL  NZL  NZL  NZL  NZL  NZL  NZL  NZL  NZL  NZL  NZL  NZL  PRT  PRT  PRT  PRT  PRT  PRT  PRT  PRT  PRT  PRT  PRT  PRT  SWE  SWE  SWE  SWE  SWE  SWE  SWE  SWE  SWE  SWE  SWE  SWE  TUR  USA  USA  USA  USA  USA  USA  USA  USA  USA  USA  USA GBR  GBR  GBR  GBR  GBR  GBR  GRC  GRC  GRC  GRC  GRC  GRC  IRL  IRL  IRL  IRL  ITA  ITA  ITA  ITA  ITA  ITA  NLD  NLD  NLD  NLD  NLD  NLD  NOR  NOR  NOR  NOR  NOR  NOR  NZL  NZL  NZL  NZL  NZL  NZL  PRT  PRT  PRT  PRT  PRT  PRT  SWE  SWE  SWE  SWE  SWE  SWE  TUR  TUR  TUR  TUR  USA  USA  USA  USA 
